Richard Rufus\u27s reformulations of Anselm\u27s Proslogion argument by DeWitt, Richard & Long, R. James
Fairfield University 
DigitalCommons@Fairfield 
Philosophy Faculty Publications Philosophy Department 
2007 
Richard Rufus's reformulations of Anselm's Proslogion argument 
Richard DeWitt 
Fairfield University, rdewitt@fairfield.edu 
R. James Long 
Fairfield University, rjlong@fairfield.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/philosophy-facultypubs 
Copyright Fordham University 2007 
Peer Reviewed 
Repository Citation 
DeWitt, Richard and Long, R. James, "Richard Rufus's reformulations of Anselm's Proslogion argument" 
(2007). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 2. 
https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/philosophy-facultypubs/2 
Published Citation 
DeWitt, Richard, and James R. Long. 2007. Richard Rufus's reformulations of Anselm's Proslogion argument. 
International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187), 329-347. 
This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rights-
holder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@fairfield.edu. 
 1 
RICHARD DE WITT and R. JAMES LONG:  Richard Rufus’s Reformulations of 
Anselm’s Proslogion Argument 
 
 ABSTRACT 
In a Sentences Commentary written about 1250 the Franciscan 
Richard Rufus subjects Anselm’s argument for God’s existence in 
his Proslogion to the most trenchant criticism since Gaunilon 
wrote his response on behalf of the “fool.” Anselm’s argument is 
subtle but sophistical, claims Rufus, because he fails to 
distinguish between signification and supposition. Rufus 
therefore offers five reformulations of the Anselmian argument, 
which we restate in modern formal logic and four of which we 
claim are valid, the fifth turning on a possible scribal error. 
Rufus’s final conclusion is that the formulation in Proslogion, 
chapter 3, is convincing, but not that of chapter 2. 
 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that St. Anselm rather soon acquired the 
status of an auctoritas, especially for his views on the Incarnation, 
his Proslogion for some reason went virtually unnoticed for nearly a 
century after his death. That was to change with the blossoming of 
scholasticism in the thirteenth century. Beginning with Alexander 
Nequam in 1201,
1
 nearly every master at both Paris and Oxford tried his 
hand at Anselm’s intriguing argument. All more or less uncritically 
accepted Anselm’s unum argumentum.
2
 
 It is not a little surprising, therefore, to find a Franciscan, 
 2 
Richard Rufus of Cornwall, who circa 1250 was somewhat grudgingly 
writing a Commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences,
3
 subjecting Anselm’s 
argument to the most trenchant criticism since the monk Gaunilo wrote 
on behalf of the atheist.
4
 Following a fair and succinct restatement of 
chapters two and three of the Proslogion,
5
 Rufus raises the following 
dubitatio: 
 
These arguments (rationes), although subtle, nevertheless seem 
sophistical. For that expression (sermo) “quo aliquid maius 
excogitari non potest” has both a signification (or meaning) and 
a supposition (or designation); its meaning is in the 
understanding even of the fool, when he hears it and also thinks 
it. For how did he say this in his heart unless he thought it? 
For it is the same to say in the heart and to think. This meaning 
that the fool has thought and placed in his heart, however, has 
no supposition; and thus he can think that what is designated 
(suppositum) can be thought not to exist. “In one way therefore,” 
as Anselm himself says, “the thing is thought, when the word 
signifying it is thought; in another way when that which the 
thing is is understood.”
6
 Thus in the former way (of thinking) 
one can think that God does not exist, but in the latter way not 
at all.
7
 
 
Thus, to Rufus’s way of thinking, Anselm, in attempting to explain the 
fool, has raised a fatal objection to his own argument and therefore 
has need of stronger and subtler arguments (fortiores, subtiliores).
8
 
 3 
These Rufus is more than happy to provide. In a syllogism that he 
later identifies as being in the fourth mood of the second figure (in 
Peter of Spain’s taxonomy
9
), he argues as follows: 
 
Therefore, let “that which a greater cannot be thought” be called 
a. I say: if it can be thought that a exists, it is necessary 
that a exist. Therefore, let this hypothesis be granted: it can 
be thought that a exists. He argues thus: whatever can be thought 
to exist and does not exist, can be thought to exist by means of 
a beginning [per initium]; a cannot be thought to exist by means 
of a beginning: therefore a cannot be thought to exist and does 
not exist. If therefore it (that is, a) can be thought to exist, 
it (a) exists.
10
 
 
Parsed in detail, the argument looks like this:
11
 
 
[1.1] I say: if it can be thought that a exists, it is necessary that 
a exist. 
[1.2] Therefore, let this hypothesis be granted: it can be thought 
that a exists. 
[1.3] He argues thus: whatever can be thought to exist and does not 
exist, can be thought to exist by means of a beginning; 
[1.4] a cannot be thought to exist by means of a beginning: 
[1.5] therefore a cannot be thought to exist and does not exist. 
[1.6] if therefore it [where “it” is a] can be thought to exist, it 
[that is, a] exists. 
 4 
[1.1] is a preliminary statement of the conclusion, and so is not 
itself a part of the argument. Note that the conclusion [1.6] is a 
conditional statement. Rufus is using what today we would call a 
Conditional Proof strategy, in which he will hypothesize the 
antecedent of the conclusion, derive the consequent, and this will 
then justify drawing, as a conclusion, the conditional statement 
itself. 
 Thus line [1.2] is his hypothesis, that is, this is where he 
hypothesizes the antecedent of the conclusion. Lines [1.3] and [1.4] 
are the premises of an argument that can reasonably be translated as a 
syllogism having the form of the fourth of the second figure. From 
this sub-argument he derives [1.5], and [1.5] straightforwardly 
entails the consequent of the overall conclusion of the argument (that 
is, [1.6]). So in short, at line [1.2] Rufus hypothesizes the 
antecedent of the conclusion, at line [1.5] he derives the consequent 
of that conclusion (or at least, a statement that clearly entails the 
consequent), and this justifies his deriving the conditional statement 
itself, that is, line [1.6]. 
 The detailed structure of Rufus’s argument can be most clearly 
illustrated using modern formalism. We can then translate (portions 
of) the argument into a reasonable syllogistic equivalent. This should 
then show the syllogistic form that Rufus would have viewed the 
argument as having.  
 
 Therefore, let: 
 a = that than which a greater cannot be thought 
 5 
 E = exist 
 TE = can be thought to exist 
 TEB = can be thought to exist through a beginning 
 →   = it is necessary that 
 
Using a standard notation, the numbered sentences in Rufus’s argument 
would then be formalized as follows: 
 
[1.1] TEa  →  ☐Ea 
[1.2] TEa 
[1.3] (x)((TEx & ~Ex) → TEBx) 
[1.4] ~ TEBa 
[1.5]  ~ (TEa & ~ Ea) 
[1.6] TEa → Ea
12
 
 
Modern Translation of Argument 1 
 
[1.3] 1.  (x)((TEx & ~Ex) → TEBx) Assumption All B are A 
[1.4] 2.  ~TEBa        Assumption Some C are not A* 
[1.2] 3.  ❘  TEa       Hypothesis 
   4.  ❘ (TEa & ~ Ea) → TEBa  From 2 
[1.5] 5.  ❘ ~ (TEa & ~ Ea)   From 3,4 Some C are not B* 
   6.  ❘ Ea         From 1,5 
[1.6] 7.  TEa → Ea        From 3-6, Conditional Proof 
 
 6 
This reconstruction of Rufus’s argument is a straightforward 
translation of the passage in question, and the argument he presents 
here is clearly valid. This focuses the issue, then, on whether the 
key assumptions of the argument--especially statements [1.3] and 1.4] 
--are plausible. 
 Needless to say, Rufus would not have had in mind an argument given 
in terms of modern predicate logic, so one remaining question is how 
he himself would have viewed the structure of the argument. As 
mentioned, he states that the argument seems to be (or at least 
importantly involves) a syllogism whose form is the fourth of the 
second figure. This form is as follows: 
 
 All B are A 
 Some C are not A 
 Therefore, Some C are not B 
 
It is far from clear how Rufus’s argument is supposed to fall into 
this form. This is true both of the modern translation above, as well 
as with the phrasing that Rufus uses. But we think this form is 
present in Rufus’s argument, most easily seen by extracting this form 
from the modern translation. Begin with statement [1.3], whose modern 
translation, as noted above, is “(x)((TEx & ~Ex) → TEBx).” This is a 
universally quantified statement, the most straightforward categorical 
translation being “All (things that can be thought to exist and do not 
exist) are (things that can be thought to exist through a beginning).” 
If we take this to be the first premise in the syllogism, then B is 
 7 
the category of (things that can be thought to exist and do not 
exist), and A is the category (things that can be thought to exist 
through a beginning). 
 If this is the first premise, then having established the category 
represented by A, the second premise of the syllogism must be “Some C 
are not (things that can be thought to exist through a beginning).” 
This suggests that [1.4] is (or more precisely, entails) the second 
premise of the syllogism. Again, the modern translation of [1.4] is 
“~TEBa,” and the straightforward categorical translation of this is 
“No (things that are a) are (things that can be thought to exist 
through a beginning).” An immediate inference from this statement is 
“Some (things that are a) are not (things that can be thought to exist 
through a beginning).” Although this categorical statement is not 
explicitly in Rufus’s text, the statement is an immediate inference 
from a statement that he does explicitly give, that is, [1.4]. Rufus 
in other words seems to be giving an immediate inference from [1.4] as 
the second premise of the syllogism rather than [1.4] itself. Given 
this structure, the category represented by C in the syllogism must be 
the category (things that are a).
13
 
 So, the conclusion “Some C are not B” must be “Some (things that 
are a) are not (things that can be thought to exist and do not 
exist).” As was the case above, this statement is not explicitly in 
Rufus’s text. But this again is an immediate inference from a 
statement that he does explicitly make, namely, statement [1.5]. 
Again, [1.5] is “~ (TEa & ~ Ea),” and the most unequivocal categorical 
translation of this is “No (things that are a) are (things that can be 
 8 
thought to exist and not exist).” An immediate inference from this is 
the categorical statement “Some (things that are a) are not (things 
that can be thought to exist and not exist).” 
 In short, if we take [1.3] and [1.4] as premises of a syllogism, 
and [1.5] as the conclusion, then we have a syllogism whose form is 
the fourth of the second figure, as Rufus notes in the text. Or more 
precisely, if we take these statements, or immediate inferences that 
follow from these statements, as the premises and conclusion of a 
syllogism, then we have a syllogism that is in the form of the fourth 
of the second figure. 
 To summarize: Rufus begins with the hypothesis “TEa,” shows that 
“Ea” follows from this hypothesis, and thus concludes “TEa → Ea,” that 
is, that if a can be thought to exist, then a exists. Moreover, the 
key move in the argument, showing that “Ea” follows from “TEa,” 
involves a syllogism whose form is the fourth of the second figure. 
 Rufus follows with a second syllogism, of the same figure and mood: 
 
Likewise, if a can be thought at all, it is necessary that a 
exist. Therefore, let there be another hypothesis, and it is 
argued as follows. Whatever can be thought and does not exist, 
if it were to exist, could either in fact or in understanding 
not exist, because, namely, it could be thought to exist through 
a beginning; a, if it were to exist, would not be able not to 
exist either in reality or in the mind, otherwise a would not be 
a; therefore a cannot be thought and still not exist. If 
therefore it (that is, a) can be thought, it exists.
14
 
 9 
 
Structurally, this argument is similar to the first, and so a briefer 
analysis will suffice. Argument 2 is as follows, again with numbers 
for later reference and with extraneous material italicized. 
 
[2.1]  If a can be thought at all, it is necessary that a exist. 
[2.2]  Therefore, let there be another hypothesis, [note: Rufus does 
not explicitly state the hypothesis, but he clearly intends 
the antecedent of the conditional in [2.1], that is] a can be 
thought 
[2.3]  and it is argued as follows: whatever can be thought and does 
not exist, if it were to exist, it could either in fact or in 
understanding not exist, 
[2.4]  because namely it could be thought to exist through a beginning; 
[2.5]  a, if it were to exist, would not be able not to exist either in 
reality or in the mind, 
[2.6]  otherwise a would not be a; 
[2.7]  therefore a cannot be thought and still not exist. 
[2.8]  if therefore it [that is, a] can be thought, it exists. 
 
Formalization of Argument 2 
Let: 
 a = that than which a greater cannot be thought 
 E = exist 
 TA = can be thought at all 
 FE = in fact exists (that is, exist in reality) 
 10 
 UE = in understanding exist 
 TEB = can be thought to exist through a beginning 
 →   = it is necessary that 
 
Then Rufus’s statements are translated as: 
 
 [2.1]  TAa  → ☐Ea 
 [2.2]  TAa 
 [2.3]  (x)((TAx & ~Ex) → (Ex → (FEx v UEx))) 
 [2.4]  [this provides some additional support for [2.3], but 
otherwise is not important in the overall structure of the 
argument] 
 [2.5]  ~(Ea → (FEa v UEa))  
[this is an awkward statement in Rufus’s text, but this 
seems the correct interpretation] 
 [2.6]  [this provides some additional support of [2.5], but also is 
not important in the overall structure of the argument] 
 [2.7]  ~(TAa & ~Ea) 
 [2.8]  TAa  → Ea 
 
This argument is similar in structure to Argument 1. In particular, 
Rufus begins with a hypothesis, derives a statement from that 
hypothesis, and thus concludes with a conditional, statement [2.8]. 
And again, as we will see below, a syllogism having the form of the 
fourth of the second figure plays a prominent role. 
 
 11 
Modern Translation of Argument 2 
 
[2.3] 1. (x)((TAx & ~Ex) → (Ex → (FEx v Uex)))  Assumption All B are A 
[2.5] 2. ~(Ea → (FEa v UEa))        Assumption Some C are not A* 
[2.2] 3. ❘ TAa              Hypothesis 
  4. ❘ (TAa & ~Ea) → (Ea → (~FEa v ~UEa))  From 1 
[2.7] 5. ❘ ~(TAa & ~Ea)          From 2,4 Some C are not B* 
  6. ❘ Ea              From 3,5 
[2.8] 7. TAa  → Ea            From 3-6, Conditional Proof 
 
As with Argument 1, the second formulation is clearly valid. Moreover, 
it too contains a sub-argument which, when translated into syllogistic 
form, has the form of the fourth of the second figure. More 
specifically, the syllogistic form of argument runs as follows. Begin 
with statement [2.3], whose modern translation is “(x)((TAx & ~Ex) → 
(Ex → (FEx v UEx))).” The most straightforward categorical translation 
of this rather complex statement is “All (things that can be thought 
at all and do not exist) are (things that, if they exist, do not exist 
in fact or do not exist in the understanding).” If, as Rufus claims, 
we are dealing with a syllogism whose form is the fourth of the second 
figure, then this first premise of the syllogism has the form “All B 
are A.” So the category represented by B would be the category of 
(things that can be thought at all and do not exist). The category 
represented by A would be the category of (things that, if they exist, 
do not exist in fact or do not exist in the understanding). 
 Recall that the second premise of this type of syllogism is of the 
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form “Some C are not A.” Having established the category represented 
by A above, the second premise must be “Some C are not (things that, 
if they exist, do not exist in fact or do not exist in the 
understanding).” This suggests that [2.5] is (or at least entails) the 
second premise of the syllogism. Again, the modern translation of 
[2.5] is “~(Ea → (FEa v UEa)),” and the most straightforward 
categorical translation of this is “No (things that are a) are (things 
that, if they exist, do not exist in fact or do not exist in the 
understanding).” As was the case with Argument 1, an immediate 
inference from this is “Some (things that are a) are (things that, if 
they exist, do not exist in fact or do not exist in the 
understanding).” So it is likely that, when Rufus states that the 
syllogism is in the fourth of the second figure, he has this immediate 
inference from [2.5] in mind as the second premise of the syllogism. 
This, then, makes the category represented by C the category of 
(things that are a). 
 Finally, then, the conclusion of this type of syllogism, of the 
form “Some C are not B,” would have to be “Some (things that are a) 
are not (things that can be thought of at all and do not exist).” This 
categorical statement is an immediate inference from [2.7], so again 
it appears that Rufus has in mind, as the conclusion, not the exact 
statement that he gives, but rather an immediate inference from the 
statement that he does give. 
 In short, the pattern here is almost exactly parallel to Argument 
1. In particular, if we take statements [2.3] and [2.5] as the 
premises of a syllogism, and take [2.7] as the conclusion, then we 
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have a syllogism whose form is the fourth of the second figure. Or 
again, more precisely, if we take Rufus’s statements or immediate 
inferences from those statements as the premises and conclusion, then 
we have a syllogism of the form Rufus suggests. 
 To summarize: the situation here is almost exactly parallel to 
Argument 1. Rufus hypothesizes “TAa,” shows that “Ea” follows, and 
thus concludes “TAa → Ea,” that is, if a can be thought at all, then a 
exists. Moreover, an important part of the argument, showing that “Ea” 
follows from “TAa,” involves a syllogism whose form is the fourth mood 
of the second figure. 
 The third argument, which Rufus identifies as being in the fourth 
mood of the first figure,
15
 runs as follows: 
 
Let it be posited that a does not exist and yet that it can be 
thought. I say the following: whatever can be thought and does not 
exist, if it were to exist, would not be that than which a greater 
cannot be thought; a can be thought, and does not exist: therefore 
a, if it were to exist, would not be that than which a greater 
could not be thought. Therefore, if a were to exist, a would not be 
a--which is absurd to say.
16
 
 
This argument is a bit odd. On the one hand, this is the easiest of 
the five arguments to translate directly and cleanly into modern 
symbolic notation. On the other hand, Rufus appears to be making a 
basic logical mistake. He is presenting a reductio argument, in which 
he hypothesizes the opposite of what he wants to prove and attempts to 
 14 
derive a contradiction as follows: “if a were to exist, a would not be 
a--which is absurd to say.” 
 Using “E” to represent “exists,”in modern form Rufus’s claim would 
be symbolized as “Ea → ~(a = a).” Now, “~(a = a)” is a contradiction, 
but the conditional statement “Ea → ~(a = a)” is in no way a 
contradiction. It merely states that if a exists, then a contradiction 
follows. Moreover, the correct conclusion to make from “Ea → ~(a = a)” 
is “~Ea.” That is, the only conclusion Rufus can draw at this point is 
the conclusion that, if the hypothesis he used to begin the proof is 
correct, then a does not exist. 
 One more preliminary note on this passage: Rufus says that this 
argument seems to be in the fourth mood of the third figure. However, 
we can find no way to reconstruct this passage so that it in any way 
resembles a syllogism of this form. For that matter, we can find no 
reconstruction of this passage that resembles any valid syllogism, or 
any valid argument--syllogistic or not. In short, this is a rather 
puzzling passage. By far the most clear and unambiguous of all the 
five arguments, it also seems clearly to be defective.
17
 
 With these caveats in mind, we present the reconstruction of 
Argument 3. As usual, extraneous material is italicized. 
 
[3.1] Let it be posited that a does not exist, and yet that it can be 
thought. 
[3.2] I say the following: whatever can be thought and does not exist, 
if it were to exist, would not be that than which a greater 
cannot be thought 
 15 
[3.3] a can be thought, and does not exist 
[3.4] therefore, if a were to exist, a would not be a–which is absurd 
to say. 
 
Formalization of Argument 3 
 
Let: 
 E = exist 
 T = can be thought 
 GNC = greater not conceivable being 
 [gnc] = name for the being greater than which cannot be conceived 
(that is, this is the name for the GNC) 
 
Then the premises of Rufus’s argument would be formalized as: 
 
 [3.1] ~Ea & Ta 
 [3.2] (x)((Tx & ~Ex) → (Ex → ~(x = [gnc]))) 
 [3.3] Ta & ~Ea 
 [3.4] Ea → ~GNCa 
 [3.5] Ea → ~(a = a) 
 
Modern Translation of Argument 3 
 
   1.  a = [gnc]            Assumption 
[3.2] 2.  (x)((Tx & ~Ex) → (Ex → ~(x = [gnc]))) Assumption 
[3.1] 3.  ❘ ~Ea & Ta           Hypothesis 
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[3.3] 4.  ❘ Ta & ~Ea           From 3 
5.      (Ta & Ea)   (Ea   ~(a = [gnc])   From 2 
6.      Ea   ~(a = [gnc])        From 4,5 
7. [3.5]   Ea   ~(a = a)          From 
1,6 
8. *** ~(~Ea & Ta)            From 3-7, Reductio  (mistaken inference) 
9. ***   Ea v ~Ta             From 
8 
10. ***   Ta   Ea             From 
9 
    
Again, the above translation seems to be a straightforward translation 
of the passage from the Rufus text. Note that line 8 is a mistaken 
inference (because line 7, as noted earlier, is not a contradiction). 
Thus lines 8, 9, and 10 do not follow. 
 To summarize: it is difficult to see this passage as anything other 
than a substantial logical mistake. From his hypothesis, Rufus seems 
to believe that he has derived a contradiction, when he has in fact 
merely derived a conditional statement whose consequent is a 
contradiction. But such a conditional statement is not contradictory, 
nor are there any other ingredients in this argument that would enable 
Rufus to derive the contradiction he needs for his reductio strategy. 
 Fourthly, Rufus formulates a syllogism which is also the fourth 
mood of the second figure
18
: 
 
Whatever in some place or at some time does not exist, even if it 
 17 
does exist in some place and at some time, can be thought to exist 
in no place and at no time, and  thus can be thought not to exist; 
a, if it exists, cannot be thought not to exist, for otherwise if a 
exists, a is not a: therefore, in no place nor at no time does it 
not exist; therefore, it exists always and everywhere.
19
 
 
In this argument Rufus seems to include more extraneous (and thus 
confusing) phrases than in the earlier arguments. In numbering the 
lines from the passage, we have omitted what seems to us to be this 
extraneous material (the ellipses indicate omitted words or phrases). 
We use “GNC” to abbreviate “the being greater than which cannot be 
conceived.” For this reconstruction, phrases that are implied but not 
explicitly stated are in italics. 
 
[4.1]  Whatever at any place or at any time does not exist...can be 
thought not to exist. 
[4.2]  The GNC, if it exists, cannot be thought not to exist. 
[4.3]  The GNC, if it exists, at no place nor at no time does it not 
exist. 
 
(The final line in the passage, that if the GNC exists, “it exists 
always and everywhere,” is merely a rephrasing of line [4.3].) 
 
Formalization of Argument 4 
 
Let: 
 18 
 NESPT = not exist at some place or time 
 TENPT = can be thought to exist at no place and at no time 
 TNE = can be thought not to exist 
 GE = is the GNC and exists 
 
Then Rufus’s statements are to be translated as: 
 [4.1] (x)(NESPTx → TNEx) 
 [4.2] GEa  → ~TNEa 
 [4.3] GEa → ~NESPTa 
 
Modern Translation of Argument 4 
 
[4.1] 1. (x)(NESPTx → TNEx)  Assumption All B are A 
[4.2] 2.  GEa → ~TNEa     Assumption 
   3.  (∃x)(GEx → ~TNEx)  From 2   Some C are not A 
   4. NESPTa → TNEa    From 1 
   5. ~TNEa → ~NESPTa    From 4 
[4.3] 6.  GEa → ~NESPTa    From 2,5 
   7.  (∃x)(GEx → ~NESPTx) From 6   Some C are not B 
 
As with Arguments 1 and 2, this argument is clearly valid. Also as 
with those arguments, we can recover the categorical argument that 
Rufus seems to have in mind. Begin with statement [4.1], which appears 
as line 1 in the proof. The categorical translation of this line is 
“All B are A,” which is the appropriate first line of a syllogism in 
the fourth mood of the second figure. The categorical translation of 
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line 3 of the proof is “Some C are not A,” which is the appropriate 
form for the second premise of a syllogism in the fourth of the 
second. Continuing a pattern we found in Arguments 1 and 2, this line 
is not explicitly in Rufus’s passage, but is rather an immediate 
inference from Rufus’s statement [4.2] (that is, line 2 of the proof). 
Finally, the categorical translation of line 7 is “Some C are not B,” 
which is the appropriate form for a syllogism of the mood and figure 
indicated by Rufus. This line again is not found explicitly in the 
Rufus passage, but is an immediate inference from Rufus’s statement 
[4.3] (that is, line 6 of the proof). 
 To summarize: as with Arguments 1 and 2, this argument is clearly 
valid, that is, the conclusion follows from the basic assumptions of 
the argument. And as with these earlier arguments, this argument does 
importantly involve a syllogism whose form, as Rufus indicated, is the 
fourth mood of the second figure. 
 Lastly, Rufus provides his fifth and final argument: 
 
Likewise, let someone say that he can think that a does not 
exist. I ask: when he thinks this, he either thinks something 
than which a greater cannot be thought or not. If not, therefore 
he does not think a; therefore, he does not think that a does 
not exist, which is contrary to the hypothesis. But if yes, 
therefore he thinks something which cannot be thought not to 
exist. For if that which he thinks could be thought not to 
exist, it could be thought to have a beginning and an end; but 
this a cannot be thought: therefore, a cannot be thought not to 
 20 
exist. Therefore, if he thinks such a thing, he is not thinking 
that a does not exist. In no way, therefore, can a be thought 
not to exist.
20
 
This is a complex and ambiguously phrased argument. Removing the 
ambiguities required a longer proof than needed for the previous 
passages, but eventually the argument is shown to be valid. 
Incidentally, Rufus does not indicate that this argument is a 
syllogistic argument, and indeed it does not appear to be directly 
translatable into any valid syllogism. As usual, extraneous material 
in italicized. 
 
[5.1] let someone say that he can think that a does not exist 
[5.2] I ask: when he thinks this, he either thinks something than which 
a greater cannot be thought or not. 
[5.3] If not...he does not think that a does not exist 
[5.4] if that which he thinks could be thought not to exist, it could 
be thought to have a beginning and an end 
[5.5] but this a cannot be thought 
[5.6] a cannot be thought not to exist 
[5.7] in no way therefore can a be thought not to exist 
 
Formalization of Argument 5 
 
Let: 
 GNC =  the being greater than which cannot be conceived 
 [gnc] =  the name for the GNC 
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 TNE = thinks does not exist (note: this is a 2-place predicate, 
e.g., “TNEab” would represent that “b” thinks “a” does not 
exist) 
 TBE = could be thought to have a beginning and an end 
 
Then Rufus’s statements can be formalized as: 
 
 [5.1] TNEab 
 [5.2] TNE[gnc]b v ~TNE[gnc]b 
 [5.3] ~TNEab 
 [5.4] (x)(TNExb  → TBExb) 
 [5.5] ~TBE[gnc]b   
    (Note: we’ve substituted “[gnc]” for Rufus’s “a”) 
 [5.6] ~TBEab 
 [5.7] ~TNEab 
 
Reconstruction of Argument 5 
 
   1.  a = [gnc]          Assumption 
[5.4] 2.  (x)( TNExb → TBExb)     Assumption 
[5.5] 3. ~TBE[gnc]b          Assumption 
[5.1] 4. ❘ TNEab           Hypothesis 
[5.2] 5. ❘ TNE[gnc]b v ~TNE[gnc]b    Theorem 
 
6.        ~TNE[gnc]b        Hypothesis 
[5.3] 7. ❘ ❘ ~TNEab           From 1,6 
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8.        TNEab & ~TNEab      From 4,7 
9.      ~TNE[gnc]b & ~TNEab & ~TNEab) From 6-8, Conditional 
Proof 
10.        TNE[gnc]b       Hypothesis 
[5.6] 11. ❘ ❘ ~TBEab          From 1,3 
 
12.        TNEab   TBEab       From 2 
13. [5.7]     ~TNEab           From 11,12 
14.        ~TNE[gnc]b         From 
1,13 
15.        TNE[gnc] & ~TNE[gnc]b     From 10,14 
16.        TNEab & ~TNEab       From 1,15 
17.    TNE[gnc]b   (TNEab & ~TNEab)  From 10-
16, Conditional Proof 
18.      TNEab & ~TNEab        From 
5,9,17 
19.    ~TNEab            From 4-18, 
Reductio 
 
As with Arguments 1, 2, and 4, Argument 5 is clearly valid, although, 
as noted, it is a substantially more complex argument and does not 
appear to have a syllogistic equivalent. 
 We can see, then, that Rufus’s arguments (except the problematic 
Argument 3) are valid, that is, the conclusions do follow from the 
basic assumptions used in the arguments. Moreover, we can clearly see 
the basic assumptions on which each argument rests. For Argument 1, 
the basic assumptions are lines [1.3] and [1.4]; for Argument 2, the 
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basic assumptions are lines [2.3] and [2.5]; for Argument 3, line 
[3.2]; for Argument 4, lines [4.1] and [4.2]; and for Argument 5, 
lines [5.4] and [5.5]. 
 What do we find when we look closely at these basic assumptions? 
Well, insists Rufus, even these strengthened and subtler arguments 
appear to be flawed, in the sense that they do not conclude to God’s 
existence in reality. Why? One could correctly make the claim that “a 
is not” (that is, “a does not exist”) is different from “a is not a”. 
For whether a exists or does not exist, it remains true that a is a, 
just as the chimera is the chimera. Therefore the opponent will claim 
that “a” can indeed be thought not to exist, but “a is not a” cannot 
be thought.
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 Of course, concedes Rufus, whoever truly sees God (presumably in 
the next life) would not be able to think that God does not exist, for 
he would be affirming and denying the same thing, which no intellect 
can do. For the infinite conditions of the divine essence, argues 
Rufus, even taken separately are each directly opposed to non-being. 
But in this life the fool (that is, the non-believer) is indeed able, 
as has been said, to think that this divine nature has no 
supposition.
22
 Though this is a wrinkle not considered by Anselm, what 
this means for Rufus (as for Aquinas after him) is that atheism is a 
respectable intellectual position, only because prior to demonstration 
in the strict sense God’s existence can indeed be denied.
23
 
 This failure to distinguish between signification and supposition 
amounts to a fallacy, in Rufus’s view, the fallacy, namely, of 
propositio plures.
24
 For Anselm’s fool is thinking of the common 
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meaning of a, but is thinking of no designation to which this common 
meaning would fit; that is, he is not thinking that anything is 
designated to which this admittedly easily understood nature would 
apply.
25
 
 For example, let someone think that something white does not exist; 
and let another say and posit that nothing in the world of beings 
(nullum entium) is in any way white. I say, asserts Rufus, that the 
hypotheses are different.
26
 Within five years, curiously, Thomas 
Aquinas was arguing the same line in his own commentary on Lombard’s 
Sentences: 
 
From this it does not follow that someone could deny or think 
that God does not exist; for he can think that nothing of this 
kind exists [in reality] namely that than which a greater cannot 
be thought.
27
 
 
In short, Rufus accepts as valid what for him is the stronger 
argument: namely, that it is impossible to think that “something than 
which a greater cannot be thought can be thought not to exist” for the 
subject is opposed to the predicate. And here, says Rufus, Anselm 
argues well, and his argument none can resist.
28
 This is, incidentally, 
roughly the line argued in our time by Norman Malcolm.
29
 
 The second hypothesis, however, falls victim to the fallacy of 
accident. Although it appears that the divine nature, which is a 
substance, namely, “something than which a greater cannot be thought” 
is opposed to this predicate “able to be thought not to exist”; the 
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predicate in this case is merely an accident, that is an intention, 
the object as it exists in the knower, to which there is another 
intention which stands in opposition.
30
 This way therefore does not 
seem to provide a necessary proof that God exists.
31
 
 Again, Aquinas in the Summa contra Gentiles makes the very same 
distinction: 
 
Because given that by this name “God” is understood something than 
which a greater cannot be thought, it will not be necessary that 
something than which a greater cannot be thought exist in the 
nature of things. For it is necessary that a thing and the 
imposition of its name be posited in the same way. However, from 
the fact that what is put forward by this name “God” is conceived 
in the mind, it does not follow that God exists except in the 
intellect. Hence it will not be necessary that that than which a 
greater cannot be thought exist except in the intellect. And from 
this it does not follow that there be anything in the nature of 
things than which a greater cannot be thought. And thus those who 
posit that God does not exist are guilty of no inconsistency, for 
it is not unreasonable for a person to grant that something greater 
can be thought either in the mind or in reality, unless that person 
concedes that there is something in fact than which a greater 
cannot be thought.
32
 
 
 Thus, in conclusion, we find in Rufus a thoroughgoing and subtly 
argued treatment of Anselm’s Proslogion argument. Reformulating the 
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argument, Rufus agrees with one formulation, the argument namely in 
Proslogion, chapter 3, but objects to the argument in chapter 2. In so 
doing, he is the first since Gaunilo, notwithstanding the status of 
Anselm as a theological authority, to object to the (by now) famous 
argument. 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
                         
1. The date is given as a terminus ante quem by Rodney M. 
Thomson, ed., Alexander Nequam: Speculum speculationum (Oxford 
UK: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), p. ix. 
 
2. F. S. Schmitt, ed., Sancti Anselmi Opera Omnia, Vol. I 
(Edinburgh, Scotland: T. Neslon, 1946), p. 93. 
 
3. Note this passage from Rufus’s proemium: “At this point some 
people like to raise certain general questions regarding theology 
itself, and this thanks to this summa of the Master [Lombard]. 
This does not seem to me to be necessary, since this summa is not 
theology itself, nor even any part of it. For the divine 
Scripture is whole in itself, perfect quite apart from this and 
every other summa.... Nevertheless because this is the custom, we 
too will touch on some of [these issues]” (translation ours), 
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Oxford, Balliol College MS. 62, col. 3. 
 
4. The text, which survives in a single manuscript (cols. 57-59 
of the Balliol College manuscript cited above), was originally 
edited by Gedeon Gal in “Viae ad existentiam Dei probandum in 
doctrina Richardi Rufi OFM,” Franziskanische Studien 38 (1956): 
187-202. Gal’s transcription with minor changes, mostly of 
punctuation and spelling, is provided below as an appendix. (When 
checked against the original, Gal’s edition proved nearly 
flawless, a tribute to a very meticulous scholar.) Gal’s stated 
intention, however, was not to analyze Rufus’s argument, but 
rather to indicate its influence on Bonaventure and Scotus 
(ibid., p. 182). 
 
5. Appendix 1-3. 
 
6. Schmitt, p. 103. 
 
7. See below, Appendix 4-5. The translations in all cases are 
ours. 
 
8. Appendix 6. 
 
9. Categorical syllogisms are classified into figures based on 
the relative positions of the middle, minor, and major terms in 
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the premises, and into moods based on the type of categorical 
statements found in the syllogism. So, for example, a syllogism 
that is in the fourth mood of the second figure has the middle 
term appearing in the predicate spot of both premises, and 
consists of a universal affirmative and a particular negative 
concluding to a particular negative: as, for example, every man 
is an animal; some rock is not an animal; therefore, some rock is 
not a man. I. M. Bochenski, ed., Petrus Hispanus, Summulae 
logicales, tract. 4 (Rome, Italy: Marietti, 1947), p. 39. 
 
10. Appendix 6. 
 
11. The bracketed numbers are for later reference; the italicized 
portions are extraneous material, with the non-italicized phrases 
constituting the actual premises of the argument. 
 
12. In the proofs to follow an Assumption can be introduced at 
any point in the proof. A Hypothesis can be introduced at any 
point, but only for a Conditional Proof or a Reductio strategy. 
All lines other than assumptions or hypotheses are justified by 
straightforward applications of the rules of predicate logic. 
Whenever a hypothesis is in effect, a vertical line ( ❘ ) is 
used to indicate this. All hypotheses must be discharged by the 
end of the proof. Thus, the lines introduced as Assumptions are 
the only unjustified lines remaining at the end of the proof, and 
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so these Assumptions are the basic premises of the argument, that 
is, the premises on which the conclusion ultimately rests. 
Relevant categorical translations are given on the far right, 
with an asterisk ( * ) indicating that the categorical statement 
is not a direct categorical translation of the line in question, 
but is rather a straightforward inference (usually an immediate 
inference) from the line in question. Finally, in Argument 3, 
three asterisks ( *** ) at the beginning of a line indicate that 
the line is, or is the result of, a logical mistake. 
 
13. Although on the face of it this is an odd-sounding way to 
phrase this, it is a standard way of dealing, in categorical 
terms, with individual objects. 
 
14. Appendix 7. 
 
15. The fourth mood of the first figure is: “No B are A; some C 
are B; so some C are not A.” 
 
16. Appendix 8. 
 
17. There is also the possibility that the Balliol scribe nodded 
at this point. Since there is extant only the single witness, 
there is no chance to check for variant readings. The option 
comes down to affirming either that Rufus erred or that the 
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nameless scribe erred (and then attempting a conjectural 
reconstruction of the text). Since there appears to be no obvious 
scribal error, we have chosen the former. 
 
18. Bochenski, p. 39. 
 
19. Appendix 9. 
 
20. Appendix 10. 
 
21. Appendix 11. 
 
22. Appendix 12. 
 
23. Compare this position with Anselm’s, for whom the insipiens 
can think that God does not exist only if he/she is indeed a fool 
(see Proslogion., cap. 3, in Schmitt, ed., p. 103), that is, that 
he/she is thinking only the verbal formula (“God does not exist”) 
and paying no heed to what the words signify (ibid., cap. 4, pp. 
103-04). 
 
24. Bochenski, p. 89. This is a proposition in which many are 
predicated of one or one of many or many of many: many of one, as 
in the case of “Socrates runs and disputes”; one of many, as in 
man being this one and this one (Socrates and Brunello); many of 
many, as in “Socrates and Plato run and dispute” (ibid.). 
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25. Appendix 13. 
 
26. Appendix 14. 
 
27. Translation ours, from Scriptum super libros Sententiarum 1, 
dist. 3, q. 1, art. 1; ed. Parma, 6:32. 
 
28. Appendix 18. 
 
29. Norman Malcolm, “Anselm’s Ontological Arguments,” The 
Philosophical Review 69 (1960): 41-62. 
 
30. Appendix 18. 
 
31. Appendix 19. 
 
32. Translation ours, from Summa contra gentiles 1.11, ed. Leon. 
manualis, 9. 
